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Abstract
We develop a theoretical framework to analyse the implications of individuals belonging
to multiple groups and trying to maintain multiple identities. Using the term identity conflict
to refer to any outcome where individuals face penalties for failure to satisfy the norms of all
groups, we show that identity conflict arises in various settings where group norms differ, and
also in settings where the actions required to satisfy all group norms coincide. In addition,
we show that identity conflict may not materialise even if group norms differ. Exploiting data
on subjective wellbeing in a nationally representative survey, we show that identity conflict
is a real phenomenon in the context of national and religious identities. Our results suggest
that the cost of identity conflict is large, and of similar magnitude to that of experiencing
discrimination in the labour market. Moreover, we find that education, as opposed to religious
affiliation, shapes the cost of identity conflict.
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1 Introduction
Identity economics acknowledges that humans are social creatures, and that belonging to any so-
cially defined group of individuals reaps the benefits of an identity subject to satisfying, to some
extent, the group’s norms for behaviour. In their seminal paper, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) aug-
ment the standard utility function, where decision-making takes into account own tastes, with an
identity component to capture the benefit of group membership and incentives to conform to group
norms.1 Failure to comply with a group’s norms is punished by a loss of identity and tradeoffs
therefore exist between maintaining an identity and pecuniary motives, with utility shaped by the
degree to which an individual’s behaviour conforms to the group’s norms. The usefulness of this
identity framework is demonstrated through its application to a wide range of issues including the
economics of gender, poverty and social exclusion.
To date theoretical contributions in identity economics largely address the implications of iden-
tity for behaviour and economic outcomes (e.g., Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2010; Georgiadis and
Manning, 2013) as well as the formation of identity (e.g., Bisin and Verdier, 2001; Darity Jr. et al.,
2006; Bénabou and Tirole, 2011; Bisin et al., 2011b, 2016; Collier, 2019). It also recognises the dis-
tinction between the short-run, where individuals take norms as given, and the medium/long-run,
where norms might be endogenous and even subject to manipulation (e.g., see Kranton, 2016, for
a survey and discussion). However, most formalisations involve individuals maintaining a single
identity. The possibility that people belong to multiple groups and possess multiple identities has
received scant attention in this literature. One notable exception is Wichardt (2008), who develops
the Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2005) framework to pursue the idea that individuals respond to
a conflict between the norms of two groups by favouring the identity of one group over the other.
In this framework, an individual belongs to two social groups and chooses between two distinct
actions. The choice between actions leads to conflict between the two group identities since each
action favours a different identity. A context-dependent and group-specific parameter reflects the
individual’s valuation of one group identity relative to the other group identity and an economic out-
come (capturing pecuniary motives), with larger valuations raising the tendency to conform with
that group’s norm. Since the size of group-specific parameters is context dependent, the choice
between actions, and which identity to favour, may differ across settings. With reference to the
existing sociological literature, Wichardt (2008) surmises this group-specific parameter is likely to
be large in small and/or homogenous groups.
In contrast to Wichardt (2008), where difficulties aligning with the norms of both groups are
ultimately resolved by favouring the identity of one group over the other, we consider an alternative
scenario where individuals belonging to more than one group try to maintain all identities. In the
theoretical section that follows, we extend the framework of Georgiadis and Manning (2013), also
deriving from Akerlof and Kranton (2000), which considers a single group and a single action. While
1See also Akerlof and Kranton (2005, 2010). Similar themes are explored, albeit in entirely different conceptual
frameworks, in, for instance, Bernheim (1994) and Sen (1984, 1993, 1999).
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Georgiadis and Manning (2013) recognise that the action space could be multi-dimensional they
limit their analysis to a single dimension as suitable for their purposes. Our contribution lies with
formally introducing multiple groups and actions in multiple dimensions in order to consider the
trade-offs that exist between group norms in addition to those that exist between personal tastes
and group norms. Specifying a continuum of actions in a multi-dimensional action space moves
beyond the binary choice of favouring one identity over another as in Wichardt (2008), allowing
instead for degrees to which an individual favours one identity over another. We use the term
identity conflict to describe any situation where the required actions to move closer to the norms
of one group reduce conformity with the norms of another group and the individual faces costs in
relation to the loss of that groups identity. An interesting implication of our framework is that
identity conflict is not restricted to settings where group norms differ and may arise even when the
actions required to fully satisfy the norms of distinct groups coincide. Moreover, identity conflict
may not materialise even though group norms differ. Thus our framework sheds new light on when
and why identity conflict arises in settings where individuals belong to multiple social groups.
To test the basic features of our framework, we use data on subjective wellbeing, which are
increasingly used as an empirical proxy of utility in testing economic principles (see for example
Di Tella et al., 2001; Van Praag and Baarsma, 2005). We nest our empirical analysis in the economics
of immigration and integration literature, which considers the determinants and labour market
consequences of ethnic, religious and national identities (Bisin et al., 2008; Battu and Zenou, 2010;
Manning and Roy, 2010; Bisin et al., 2011a; Islam and Raschky, 2015). A common theme in
this literature is that ethnic minorities sit between two cultures. Using a unique question in the
UK Citizenship Survey, which addresses the potential for conflict between national and religious
identities, we show that individuals reporting some conflict between these identities experience
lower levels of life satisfaction. This finding also has broader implications for the study of identity
economics insofar as it provides indirect evidence on a core assumption made in this literature i.e.
that people face penalties for deviating from the norms of a group. Our results suggest that the cost
of identity conflict is non-trivial and is similar in magnitude to that of experiencing discrimination
in the labour market.
As our empirical research explicitly concerns religious identity, and as Muslims have received
considerable attention in the immigration and integration literature (see for example Constant et al.,
2006; Bisin et al., 2008; Georgiadis and Manning, 2013), we also investigate whether the outcomes
of Muslims are different to others in our empirical application. Interestingly, however, we find little
evidence that the cost of identity conflict varies between Christians and Muslims. On the other
hand, the cost of identity conflict is larger for low-educated individuals, which is consistent with
these individuals lacking the skills to navigate the demands of multiple identities.
In a world where people belong to multiple groups, there is always the risk that people will
struggle to satisfy the norms of all groups to which they belong. If identity conflict emerges, utility
is impacted negatively, which represents an issue for both the individual and the society they inhabit.
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Our research demonstrates that identity conflict is a real phenomenon in the context of national
and religious identities and provides the first estimate of its cost. It also sheds light on policy levers
that might lessen the cost of identity conflict, for example, targeting levels of formal education.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines our theoretical frame-
work, Section 3 introduces our data, Section 4 presents our empirical analysis, while Section 5
concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
Our theoretical framework builds on the work of Akerlof and Kranton (2000), and in particular
Georgiadis and Manning (2013), who model utility as the sum of two quadratic loss functions
that together capture the importance of own preferences and identity concerns in decision-making
processes. As noted earlier, while Georgiadis and Manning (2013) recognise the possibility of
multiple identities, we formally extend their analysis here to examine the actual trade-offs and
tensions involved in trying to maintain multiple identities, and specifically the scope for identity
conflict to materialise.
Consider an individual who faces a decision to locate at some point, an n-vector, x, in the
n-dimensional action space, E ⊂ Rn, where each dimension corresponds to the quantity or quality
of a distinct action.2 Utility comprises a conventional component, that is independent of identity
concerns, reflecting the individual’s own (non-identity based) tastes with respect to these actions.
This is modelled according to A − 1
2
a′v where A is the maximum conventional, or non-identity,
utility available to the individual and a and v are n-vectors where the kth element of v is given
by vk = (xk − x˜k)
2.3 Hence, in the absence of identity concerns, x˜ is the optimising vector for the
individual in the action space. The elements of a are penalty weights for movements away from the
conventional utility optimising selection of x in each of the n dimensions reflecting the underlying
opportunity costs. These may be viewed as characterising the individual’s flexibility or rigidity with
respect to their own (non-group identity) norms in each dimension.
Utility also comprises an unconventional component reflecting identity concerns,
∑
Bg− 1
2
bg′wg,
where Bg represents the utility benefits available to the individual from fully conforming to the
norms of group g in each dimension.4 We refer to x¯g as the actions required for a particular
individual to fully satisfy the norms of identity group g and use this interchangeably with the
‘norms’ of group g. The kth element of wg is given by wgk = (xk − x¯
g
k)
2 and is assigned the penalty
2We do not limit the action space to Rn+, as some actions may take negative as well as zero or positive values.
3The key characteristic of this part, v, of the loss function is that the penalty is convex in the distance differential,
xk − x˜k. Note, however, that the function symmetrically penalises a given overshoot xk − x˜k = t and undershoot
x˜k − xk = t (t > 0). In practice, while the actual penalty may be asymmetric in this respect, such considerations do
not qualitatively affect our analysis.
4Note, Bg can be negative or zero as well as positive. An individual may not wish to have a particular identity
(Bg < 0) but the costs associated with non-conformity to that group’s norms may lead them to adopt actions to
some extent satisfying those norms so as to reduce non-conformation costs.
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weight, bgk. If a group’s norms specify particular actions for all dimensions in the action space, the
norms are represented by a single vector in that action-space. If group g’s norms specify actions
in all dimensions but one, k (i.e. the group does not care about actions in dimension k), then the
penalty weight in that dimension is zero, bgk = 0, and the norms are represented by a line parallel
to the kth axis along which all points equally well satisfy the group’s norms.5
Where a group’s norms depend on a particular action in dimension k, the penalty weight, bgk,
can be viewed as a combination of the flexibility/rigidity of group g to the individual moving away
from its norms in dimension k and the individual’s ability to mitigate utility loss from penalties
associated with deviation from the norms. Let βgk be the penalty weight imposed by group g for
movements away from their norms in dimension k, and Igk , where I ∈ [0, 1], be an index inversely
related to the individual’s immunity towards, or ability to mitigate, any penalty, such that their
realised penalty weight for that dimension is given by bgk = β
g
kI
g
k . Hence, where group g’s norms
specify a particular action in dimension k (i.e. group g cares about action k), the individual might
not suffer utility loss for deviating from the group’s norms in the kth dimension because (i) the
group has a zero penalty (βgk = 0), (ii) the individual is fully immune to, or able to mitigate any
effect of, the penalty upon their utility (Igk = 0), or (iii) both. It may appear that the absence
of a penalty for movements away from a group’s specified norms in one dimension is equivalent to
the group not having norms in that dimension since bgk = 0 in both cases. However, as we shall
see later, there can be important distinctions between the two cases. Also, note that while the
location of a group’s norms and the identity loss penalties may vary by individual characteristics,
for expositional simplicity, we omit individual-specific indexing throughout much of the following
discussion.
Without loss of generality, we base our theoretical discussion on a stylised example involving two
socially defined identity groups, g ∈ {F, S}, where F represents an individual’s (extended) family
and S represents a sports team. We choose these group identities as the various scenarios we wish
to explore are readily illustrated within this setting, and these group identities are also adopted
in Wichardt’s (2008) study of multiple identities. We also draw on examples from the film Bend
it like Beckham (2002) (henceforth, BilB), where sports team and family group identities play a
prominent role, to illustrate certain aspects of our theoretical framework.6 Hence, individuals solve
the following problem:
max
x
U(.) = A+BF +BS −
1
2
a′v −
1
2
(
bF
)
′
wF −
1
2
(
bS
)
′
wS (1)
where the first-order conditions yield the following expression for the optimising co-ordinate, x∗,
5In the case that the group’s norms do not depend on actions in two (more than two) dimensions then the norms
are represented by a plane (hyper-plane) over the relevant dimensions.
6Bisin et al. (2016) also signpost their work with this film in a separate but not unrelated issue of ethnic identity
and integration in the context of marriage choices and identity formation.
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taking into account the conventional and identity-based aspects of utility:
x∗k =
akx˜k + b
F
k x¯
F
k + b
S
k x¯
S
k
ak + bFk + b
S
k
(2)
In practice, the norms of a group are unlikely to encompass actions in each and every dimension
of the action space, for example, the sports team norms may not extend to the amount of music
the individual listens to. The role of all choices (in terms of relevant opportunity costs) in other
dimensions of the action space are then captured by the loss function for the individual’s own tastes:
A − 1
2
a′v. However, for simplicity and ease of graphical exposition, we continue our discussion
assuming that all norms are identified across the same two same dimensions, k ∈ {1, 2}. Let x1
represent the number of weekly sports team training sessions attended and x2 represent the number
of annual family events attended. Hence, from Eq. (1) the individual now maximises:
max
x1,x2
U(.) = A+BF +BS −
1
2
[a1, a2]

(x1 − x˜1)
2
(x2 − x˜2)
2

− 1
2
[bF1 , b
F
2 ]

(x1 − x¯
F
1 )
2
(x2 − x¯
F
2 )
2

− 1
2
[bS1 , b
S
2 ]

(x1 − x¯
S
1 )
2
(x2 − x¯
S
2 )
2


(3)
To introduce the concepts of no conflict, conflict and identity conflict we begin with a simple
model where there is perfect information and the penalty weights for deviations from the norms are
exogenous and fixed for a given individual. In our framework there is no conflict if the individual can
fully appropriate the gains associated with the set of norms that includes both their own norms (i.e.
non-identity norms) and the norms of each group (i.e. identity norms). In other words, there is no
conflict if the individual can achieve the maximum available utility, U(.) = A+BF +BS. It follows
from Eq. (2) that there is no conflict under three conditions. The first, and perhaps most obvious,
is the case where the set of norms are co-located as is illustrated in Figure 1(a) where x¯S = x¯F = x˜.
In this scenario, the amount of sports training and family events required to satisfy the sports team
norms is exactly the same as that required to satisfy the family norms. Moreover, in the absence of
identity concerns, these are also the individual’s preferred actions. Perhaps, from the perspective of
the sports team, attending training sessions is valued because it shows team-enhancing commitment
and improves the team’s chance of winning matches while attending family events is valued because
it improves the teams’s image if team members are family orientated. From the perspective of the
family, training is perhaps valued because it reflects the family identity of fitness, health or sporting
prowess while family events provide opportunities for bonding. At the same time, however, beyond
a certain point, both groups find training and family events to be excessive. For instance, the sports
team prefers the individual to train in moderation to avoid injuries while they view attendance at
too many family events as a character flaw. Similarly, the family views excessive sports training
as one-dimensional and encourages the pursuit of wider interests while too many family events risk
family discord. Thus both the sports team and the family penalise too little or too much of a given
activity but, under co-location, in a happy coincidence, both groups’ norms agree identically with
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the individual’s own norms on the required actions in these dimensions. In BilB such co-location
occurs for Jules (one of the main characters, played by Keira Knightly) since her own norms, the
sports team and her father’s norms coincide, such that she experiences no conflict in maintaining
these identities.
Figure 1: No conflict
(a) Co-located norms (b) Partially co-located norms
However, there is another characterisation of co-location, we label this partial co-location, which
in the context of a multi-dimensional action space, provides more interesting insights with respect
to when conflict, and identity conflict, may or may not arise. Consider the situation in Figure
1(b) where each of the group norms, x¯g (g ∈ {F, S}), is represented by a different vector in the
2-dimensional action space, but the penalty weight on actions in the x1 dimension (weekly training
sessions) is zero for group S (bS1 = 0), while the penalty weight for group F is zero in the other
dimension (bF2 = 0). Hence, an individual can vary x1 (x2) without experiencing a utility loss
associated with the identity of group S (F ). So, while the group norms are not co-located, the
individual can avoid identity/utility losses from deviation from the norms of group S (F ) along the
horizontal (vertical) dashed line rr′ (qq′). From the definition of bgk above, zero utility penalty for
deviating from specified norms can arise because the group does not impose a penalty (βgk = 0)
and/or because the individual is immune to the penalty (Igk = 0). In this context, we refer to the
collection of points in the action space, where deviation from a group’s norms involves no identity
loss, as the group’s ‘quasi-norms’. Partial co-location of the set of norms then arises if these dashed
lines representing the groups’ quasi-norms, both pass through the individual’s non-identity norms, x˜,
as illustrated in Figure 1(b): the individual can locate at x˜ without incurring losses and experiences
no conflict. Suppose that the individual prefers to attend five family events per year and train once
per week: x˜ = (1, 5). However, fully satisfying the family norms requires x¯F = (1, 7) while fully
satisfying the sports team norms requires x¯S = (3, 5). Partial co-location occurs if the individual is
able to train once per week and attend five family events per year without incurring a loss of utility
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from any group penalties for deviating from their norms. For example, the sports team might not
always select the individual to play for the first team if training is missed while the family may
greet the individual less enthusiastically after a family event is missed but neither outcome causes
the individual a utility/identity loss. In BilB, Jules schools Jess (played by Parminder Nagra) on
the art of navigating her own mother’s norms for sporting activity that differ from her own norms
and that of the sports team - she simply ignores her mother’s objections - suggesting that either
Jules’ mother does not actually impose penalties for deviating behaviour or that Jules is immune
to the penalties imposed. Hence, in this instance, the norms are partially co-located. BilB further
includes examples to illustrate how partial co-location might arise. For example, when Jess initially
joins the football team, at her older sister Pinky’s (played by Archie Panjabi) advice, she hides
her involvement with the team to avoid conflict with the family norms for sporting activity, and
this subterfuge is successful for a while. In addition, while Pinky believes that she herself, through
subterfuge, has avoided penalties from deviating from an established family norm in conducting a
‘secret’ relationship, it later transpires that her mother knew of this deviating behaviour but chose
not to confront and penalise it. Thus, while the family norms included specific actions regarding
the conduct of certain relationships, with assumed sanctions for deviating behaviour, no penalty
was actually applied for deviating from these norms. Note that in practice, where a group’s norms
specify particular actions in a given dimension, penalty weights might only be zero locally as opposed
to globally (as implied by the horizontal/vertical quasi-norms in Figure 1(b)): a group may not
penalise small deviations or small penalties might be easier to deflect. In reality, the realised penalty
weights bgk may be endogenous and increasing in the size of the deviation from a group’s norms in
a given dimension, for instance: bgk = β
g
k(w
g
k)I
g
k(w
g
k), where β
g ′
k (w
g
k), I
g ′
k (w
g
k) ≥ 0.
7 As a consequence
the vertical/horizontal lines representing the groups’ quasi-norms in Figure 1(b) may not extend
far away from the point vector norms.
Finally, there will be co-location and no conflict where the individual, and/or one or more of
the groups, do not specify (i.e. do not care about) actions in a given dimension (or dimensions)
such that a situation akin to that in Figure 1(b) arises, but where the vertical/horizontal dotted
lines are actual norms rather than quasi-norms. For instance, there is co-location at x˜ in Figure
1(b) if, say, neither the individual nor the sports team care about actions in the x1 dimension (their
norms are both represented by the horizontal line rr′) and the family does not care about actions
in the x2 dimension (their norms are represented by the vertical line qq
′). More generally, conflict
and utility loss will not arise so long as there is at least one point in the n-dimensional action space
where all norms and/or quasi-norms intersect. However, as the previous example from BilB helps
to illustrate, there is a potentially important difference between (i) a group not specifying actions
in a given dimension (norms extending beyond a single vector to a line, plane or hyper-plane),
and (ii) a group specifying actions in a given dimension but not penalising deviating behaviour
(quasi-norms extending beyond a single vector). In the latter case, one individual might experience
7Again, the specification here is symmetric to variations beyond and below the norms.
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conflict (changing their behaviour to accommodate the non-co-location of group norms) whereas
another individual who better understands the ‘grey’ areas and how to operate within them (since
they know when they do not need to change behaviour to accommodate specified norms that are not
penalised) might not. In BilB, Pinky’s ignorance as to the true penalty ‘menu’ for deviating from
family norms on the conduct of relationships drove her to (potentially distortionary) subterfuge
that could have caused unnecessary conflict. We return to this issue later on when we introduce
imperfect information.
Since ‘no conflict’ emerges where U(.) = A+BF +BS, the characterisation of ‘conflict’ is where
U(.) < A + BF + BS, and hence due to differences in terms of required actions across own and
group norms, the individual experiences a utility loss relative to a situation in which norms or quasi-
norms are co-located. Within the broad set of conflict possibilities we are particularly interested
in ‘identity conflict’ (defined above), and how seeking to maintain multiple group identities relative
to maintaining a single identity shapes behaviour. Specifically, the desire to maintain own (non-
identity) norms and the norms of a single group involves a balancing act, with the individual
generally choosing to locate somewhere between own norms and that of the group. However, with
multiple group identities to maintain, the nature of the balancing act between any pair of norms will,
in general, vary according to the location and penalty weights of the other norms. For instance,
tensions between any two group identity norms will typically be a function of the location and
penalty weights with respect to own norms: two different individuals facing identical group norms
and penalties may experience entirely different tensions with respect to maintaining these group
norms. As we have already seen above, conflict and identity conflict need not arise in the case
of an individual seeking to maintain multiple group identities even if those group norms are not
co-located. However, as we will see, below, in the context of multiple group identities, identity
conflict is possible even when group norms are actually co-located.
Figure 2 illustrates identity conflict in various situations where groups norms are not co-located.
In Figure 2(a), the individual’s non-identity norms, sit directly between the two group norms, and
hence any movement towards satisfying the norms of one group requires moving farther away from
the norms of the other group. In this case, with non-zero realised penalty weights, identity conflict
arises because the family (sports team) norms require the individual to attend more family events
(training sessions) and train less (attend fewer family events). In BilB, Jess experiences identity
conflict as satisfying the football team’s norms (playing the football final) directly pulls her away
from satisfying her family norms (attending her sister Pinky’s wedding). Figure 2(b) tells a slightly
different story as in this case some movement (i.e. vertically from x˜) may help to satisfy the norms
of both groups, but ultimately at some point there is a conflict between satisfying the norms of one
group at the expense of the other. Finally, in Figure 2(c) identity conflict arises once the individual
has reached out from x˜ to x¯S. Any further movement towards satisfying x¯F involves movement
away from the norms located at x¯S. The quadratic loss function formally establishes the notion that
more of an action is not always better. In Figure 2(c), the sports team penalises overtraining while
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the family pushes the individual to zealously pursue sporting achievement. For example, in BilB,
the team coach Joe (played by Jonathan Rhys Meyers) is coaching, rather than playing, football
due to a career-ending injury, caused by excessive training while trying to satisfy his father’s norms,
to the detriment of himself and his team.8
Figure 2: Identity conflict
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 3(a) illustrates how identity conflict may arise in situations where group norms are co-
located. While the same actions are required to fully satisfy the norms of both groups, in general,
the individual will optimally locate somewhere between x˜ and x¯F = x¯S, and not necessarily on
the straight line joining these points (the dashed line in Figure 3(a)). The penalty weights in
the quadratic loss functions may differ by dimension in the action space and across each set of
norms (the group identity norms and the non-identity norms). These variations in the weights, in
8Note that the extent to which individuals feel that utility loss is attributable to identity conflict might depend
upon where the individual’s non-identity norms are located relative to group norms. However, for our empirical
application, it is important that individuals are able to recognise that there is conflict in the sense that it is significant
between the identities they are trying to maintain rather than the exact size of any associated utility loss. We return
to the issue of an individual recognising or attributing conflict to maintaining multiple identities below.
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combination with differing locations of norms, determine the trade-offs, and ultimately, the location
of optimising choices in accordance with Eq. (2). To illustrate, suppose own norms are x˜ = (2, 2)
and there is only one group identity, say F , with x¯F = (10, 10) and denote the optimising location,
x∗F . If the same weights apply to each dimension (a1 = a2 and b
F
1 = b
F
2 ) then x
∗
F will be on the
dashed line in Figure 3(a). If, however, the weights are not the same across the two dimensions, for
instance, with penalty weights (a1, a2) = (1, 1) and (b
F
1 , b
F
2 ) = (0.5, 1), the optimising co-ordinate
in the action space using Eq. (2) is x∗F = (4.7, 6.0), which lies above the straight line joining x˜
and x¯F . The same logic applies if S is the only group and x∗S is the optimising location, such that
unless bF = bS, x∗S will not be located at the same point as x
∗
F , even though x¯
F = x¯S. Hence,
even though group norms are co-located, the individual’s choice is based on the set of norms that
also includes own norms, and once these are taken into account, the actions required to best satisfy
the norms of one group conflict with the actions required to best satisfy the norms of the other
group. Figure 3(a) captures this situation, where the grey dots identify the individual’s optimising
location in the absence of group S, x∗F , and in the absence of group F , x
∗
S. Such incidences of
identity conflict might, in practice, be quite visible to the individual, especially given that adoption
of group identities is likely to have a temporal dimension. For example, in BilB, Jess has a family
identity to maintain when she makes the choice to gain a sports team identity. While she might
have initially located at a point akin to x∗F , her decision to adopt a sports team identity might have
involved moving to a point akin to x∗S, were it not for the need to maintain her family identity.
That x∗F 6= x
∗
S is indicative of identity conflict.
Figure 3: Identity conflict with co-located group norms and no identity conflict
with partially co-located group norms
(a) Co-located group norms and bF 6=
bS
(b) Partial co-located group norms
Figure 3(b) illustrates how conflict, but not identity conflict, arises when group norms are
partially co-located. Here, the family and sports team ‘quasi-norms’ (defined earlier), respectively,
rr′ and qq′, are partially co-located at x¯FS. Since x¯FS 6= x˜ there is conflict, U(.) < A+ BF + BS,
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and the individual optimally locates at a point x∗ (not illustrated in the Figure). However, it is the
case that as long as x∗ is located at the point a in the Figure, then there is no identity conflict.
To see this, consider once again the optimising location with respect to the individual’s own non-
identity norms and the norms of single group g, x∗g. With reference to Eq. (2), the equation for
the optimising vector, it is straightforward to see that x∗F will lie vertically between x˜ and x¯
F on
the line uu′.9 Similarly, x∗S, is the optimising location when seeking to accommodate own norms
and that of the sports team, and lies on the dotted horizontal line vv′. While x∗F and x
∗
S are not
co-located they are partially co-located at a and it is straightforward to see that x∗ must be located
at a. Hence, from x∗F (x
∗
S), the addition of the other identity S (F ) involves a change in behaviour
but no utility loss: there is no identity conflict.10
To facilitate a simple exposition our framework adopted a number of restrictive assumptions.
We have addressed one such assumption, fixed and endogenous penalty weights, above. Another
simplifying assumption is that of perfect information whereas, in practice, imperfect information
may arise for various reasons and have important implications for whether or not conflict or identity
conflict materialises. Here, we formally recognise that the actions required to satisfy, or even the
ability to identify, a given group’s norms may be a function of individual characteristics, X, which
might include age, gender, religion, education and so on. In BilB, for example, according to Jess’s
mother it was ok for Jess to play football with friends when she was younger but these actions are
at odds with family norms now she is older.
Recognising information imperfections, if the true location of the norms of group g for an
individual with characteristics X is given by χ¯g(X), the perceived location of these norms in
dimension k may be given by:
x¯
g
k = ϕ
g
k(χ¯
g
k(X), X) (4)
Here, individual characteristics may affect both the actions required to achieve a group’s norms
but also the accuracy in perception of those actions, and raises the possibility that conflict and
identity conflict might differ by these characteristics. By way of illustration, if a popular, but
ultimately inaccurate, stereotype exists regarding the norms of a group, individuals without the
ability to recognise the true location of those norms may try to adhere to that stereotype, causing
unnecessary conflict with the norms of another group (or own norms) in so doing. One characteristic
that may help people to accurately identify group norms is education.
We further recognise that realised penalty weights may also be a function of individual charac-
9x∗F will be on the vertical line uu
′ because deviations left or right from x˜ involve utility loss under the individual’s
own norms while left or right movement away from x¯F has no penalty loss relative to the family norms. On the other
hand, vertical movements away from x˜ and x¯F both incur utility losses hence x∗F will lie at some point vertically
between these two points reflecting the relative tradeoffs.
10This is easily seen from Eq. (2). To illustrate, in determining the optimising vector x∗F in the x2 dimension, note
bS2 = 0 since x
∗
F is the optimising vector when considering only own norms and group F’s norms (ignoring group S’s
norms). However, the optimising vector x∗ (across all norms) in the x2 dimension, produces the same result since
bS2 = 0 as the individual is immune to, and/or there are no penalties employed for deviations from the norms of
group S in the x2 dimension.
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teristics. For example, an individual with characteristics X may face penalty βgk(X) from group g
for deviating from its norms in dimension k but may also be able to mitigate the penalty according
to the index Igk(X). Hence, in this instance, the realised penalty weight for an individual with
characteristics X may be given by λgk(X) = β
g
k(X)I
g
k(X). Under imperfect information, individuals
may also differ in their ability to judge realised penalty weights, with perceived penalty weight for
deviating from group g’s norms in dimension k given by:
b
g
k = ψ
g
k(λ
g
k(X), X) (5)
Thus individuals may erroneously believe the penalty weights of one group to be very large for
them, when in fact the weights are small (see our discussion of Pinky’s ‘secret’ relationship in BilB
above), which could in turn influence where individuals locate in the action space. As with norm
location, above, erroneous beliefs about the penalties associated with one group’s norms may result
in unnecessary sacrifices of the norms of another group, leading to larger than necessary losses
of identity/utility, but where an individual’s characteristics, such as education, helps to resolve
information imperfections, utility losses may be smaller.
Imperfect information can also work the other way round - that is group g may not be able to
accurately observe where a particular individual has located in the action space and this information
asymmetry may vary by individual characteristics. So, for instance, it may be particularly difficult
to identify how much an individual is deviating from a group’s norms if they have a lot of mobility,
such as a job which involves being away from the community where the relevant group identity is
‘judged’ and potentially ‘penalised’. In BilB, Jess is able to avoid conflict only for a short period
because her physical proximity to her family (e.g. living at home) made it harder to hide her football
kit and local press coverage of her sporting success increased the visibility of her actions. So despite
facing the same norm locations and penalties as others, those who have greater freedom of mobility
might be better placed to avoid penalties for deviating behaviour, and therefore experience lower
utility losses due to conflict. A well established literature suggests education is positively associated
with geographical mobility (see for instance Greenwood, 1997; Molloy et al., 2011), lending further
support to the argument that education might help to mitigate losses from conflict and the incidence
of identity conflict.
Figure 4 illustrates a situation where none of the norms are co-located. However, for an indi-
vidual with characteristics X it might be the case that a combination of their ability to understand
the actual penalty ‘menu’ and mitigate some penalties or avoid detection, might result in them
facing quasi-norms for each group indicated by the dashed and solid bordered shapes, which they
can exploit to avoid any conflict. However, an individual with different characteristics may not
have access to these conflict-eliminating quasi-norms or may not be aware of them and as a result
experience conflict as they reconcile the three disparate norms ultimately resulting in relative loss
of utility due to conflict.
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Figure 4: No identity conflict with overlapping quasi-norms
In summary, in this section we extend the analysis of Georgiadis and Manning (2013) to formally
examine the trade-offs and tensions that exist when individuals try to maintain multiple identities.
In doing so we highlight some important, yet hitherto under-explored, aspects of identity conflict.
For example, we show that identity conflict is not restricted to settings where group norms differ
and may arise even when the actions required to fully satisfy the norms of distinct groups coincide.
We further suggest that an individual’s characteristics, such as their education, might affect their
capacity to identify the location of group norms, their ability to act to mitigate the impact of
penalties from deviating from group norms and, via their increased mobility, the capacity of identity
groups to monitor any deviating behaviour. This latter conjecture is, of course, largely a matter
for empirical investigation, and in what follows we consider the issue of identity conflict from an
empirical perspective.
3 Data
We test the basic features of our framework using real-world data. For this purpose, we exploit the
existence of a nationally representative UK survey that collects information on the potential for
conflict between national and religious identities. Such tensions may arise as religious norms are
typically more conservative than secular norms. We therefore nest our empirical analysis within
the economics of immigration and integration literature, which focuses on the determinants and
impact of majority and minority group identities, operationalised via ethnic, religious and national
identities (see for example Constant et al., 2006; Bisin et al., 2008; Georgiadis and Manning, 2013).
Specifically, we use the 2009/10 and 2010/11 waves of the Citizenship Survey,11 which interviews
11Department for Communities and Local Government and Ipsos MORI, Citizenship Survey, 2009-2010 [computer
file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], April 2011. SN: 6733 , http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/
UKDA-SN-6733-1. Department for Communities and Local Government and Ipsos MORI, Citizenship Survey, 2010-
2011 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], December 2012. SN: 7111 , http://dx.doi.
org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-7111-1.
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approximately 16,000 individuals aged 16+ living in England and Wales and spans 2001-2011.
Initially administered bi-annually, it moved to yearly surveys coinciding with the financial year
(April-March) from 2007 onwards. The Citizenship Survey focuses on community cohesion and
race relations, and comprises a core sample of approximately 10,000 individuals as well as an ethnic
minority boost sample of approximately 7,000 individuals, allowing meaningful analysis of both
populations. National identity is obtained from individuals via the question ‘What do you consider
your national identity to be? Please choose as many or as few as apply’ with response categories
‘English’, ‘Scottish’, ‘Welsh’, ‘Irish’, ‘British’ and ‘Other’. We exclude individuals who report ‘Irish’
(<1%) and ‘Other’ (15%) national identities as well as non-responses (<1%). These exclusions aim
to ensure that individuals are referring to a British national identity when considering the potential
for conflict between national and religious identities. To establish religious affiliation respondents
are asked ‘What is your religion even if you are not currently practising?’ with response categories
‘Christian’, ‘Buddhist’, ‘Hindu’, ‘Jewish’, ‘Muslim’, ‘Sikh’, ‘Any other religion’ and ‘No religion
at all’. The majority of the sample identify as Christians (53%), followed by Muslims (22%),
Hindus (4%), and Sikhs (2%). We drop those who are not religious from our sample (17%) as well
Buddhists (<1%), Jews (<1%) and followers of unspecified religions (<2%) though our results are
not sensitive to dropping less well-represented religions. A separate indicator variable is created to
identify Muslims while Hindus and Sikhs are combined (although these are distinct religions they
share commonalities and have empirically similar effects in our analysis). Respondents are also
further asked ‘Do you consider that you are actively practising your religion?’, with Christians least
likely and Muslims most likely to consider they are active participants in their religion.
In 2007, the Citizenship Survey introduced a Self Identity module. As part of this module,
respondents are asked ‘How important is your religion to your sense of who you are?’ and ‘How
important is your national identity to your sense of who you are?’ with response categories ‘Very
important’, ‘Quite important’, ‘Not very important’, and ‘Not at all important’.12 These measures
of identity are in keeping with existing measures employed in the immigration and integration
literature. For example, Battu and Zenou (2010); Bisin et al. (2011a) use attitudes and behaviours
indicating a preference for the ethnic minority culture such as religiosity, maintaining traditions
and customs, and hostility to inter-ethnic marriage while Manning and Roy (2010); Georgiadis and
Manning (2013) use self-reported national identity. Respondents who think both their religious
and national identities are quite/very important (62%) are asked a follow-up question ‘You said
that both your national identity and religion are important to you. Do you ever feel there is a
conflict between these?’ with response categories ‘All of the time’ (2%), ‘Most of the time’ (5%),
‘Some of the time’ (11%), ‘Rarely’ (16%) and ‘Never’ (63%).13 This follow-up question, which is
a unique feature of the Citizenship Survey, allows us to identify a potential conflict between group
12Less than 1% of respondents select ‘Don’t know’.
13A further 2% of respondents spontaneously reply ‘Don’t know’. All ‘Don’t know’ responses are placed into the
base category of any dummy variables created but our results are not sensitive to this choice.
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norms. Georgiadis and Manning (2013) use earlier waves of the Citizenship Survey to analyse the
intensity of conflict between national and religious identities and find that intensity of conflict is
higher among Muslims while certain neighbourhood characteristics (i.e. the extent to which people
respect ethnic differences) reduce the intensity of conflict. While factors influencing the degree to
which people report conflict are of considerable interest, our goal is to test the basic features of
our framework, which centres on whether conflict between national and religious identities reduces
utility. To facilitate the interpretation of our analysis, we construct a single indicator variable,
which balances the frequency of conflict with sample size considerations. This indicator variable is
equal to one if respondents feel there is a conflict between their national and religious identities at
least some of the time. For ease of presentation we label this variable ‘Conflicting identities’ but
it more aptly represents ‘National and religious identities are important and are in conflict at least
some of the time’. Our main sample therefore consists of those individuals who think both their
national and religious identities are quite/very important though we extend this sample to include
individuals who think that neither, or just one, of these identities is important when examining the
benefits of group membership. We include both ethnic majority and ethnic minority individuals
in our sample because any potential conflict between national and religious identities need not be
confined to ethnic minority populations.
Data on subjective wellbeing is collected by the Citizenship Survey from 2009/10 onwards. Such
data are used as an empirical proxy of utility in other research testing economic principles (see for
example Di Tella et al., 2001; Van Praag and Baarsma, 2005). Respondents are asked ‘All things
considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays?’ with response categories
‘Very satisfied’, ‘Fairly satisfied’, ‘Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied’, ‘Fairly dissatisfied’ and ‘Very
dissatisfied’. Responses to this question are somewhat right-skewed with 87% indicating they are
‘Very satisfied’ or ‘Fairly satisfied’ and 1% indicating that they are ‘Very dissatisfied’. We therefore
construct an indicator variable, which is equal to one if individuals indicate they are ‘Very satisfied’
and is equal to zero otherwise.14 As questions on the importance of, and conflict between, identities
immediately precede the question on life satisfaction, the order of questions could, in principle, lead
to a context effect. This may arise if a lead-in question induces a positive (negative) mood resulting
in more positive (negative) wellbeing appraisals or if a lead-in question makes a topic temporarily
accessible when making wellbeing appraisals. A meta-analysis presented in Schimmack and Oishi
(2005) suggests that context effects are, in general, small. Their findings also suggest that topics
that are irrelevant but made temporarily accessible by lead-in questions are excluded from wellbeing
appraisals while topics that are important are chronically accessible and would feature in wellbeing
appraisals regardless. This raises the possibility that topics that are moderately important but not
chronically accessible are susceptible to context effects although Schimmack and Oishi (2005) are
unable to provide support for this in their research. On the other hand, Deaton and Stone (2016)
find that lead-in questions relating to political and economic circumstances produce a large context
14We have also tried exploiting the entire distribution of responses and our main results are very similar.
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effect, and moreover, that it is the answer to, rather than the existence of, these questions that
produces the context effect. One plausible, yet untested, explanation for these findings put forward
by Lucas et al. (2016) is that these lead-in questions changed the interpretation of the subsequent
wellbeing question to represent a further evaluation of political and economic circumstances. Taken
together, this might suggest that a context effect, if present in this analysis, would produce an
upper bound estimate of the cost of identity conflict.
The Citizenship Survey also collects socioeconomic and demographic information on respon-
dents, including gender, household composition, employment and financial situation. However,
education is not asked of respondents aged 70+ and therefore we exclude these individuals from
our sample (17%). A rarity in survey data, the Citizenship Survey contains an array of questions
to gauge lifestyle and environmental conditions, such as interactions with people of different race
and faith groups, and fears or experiences of discrimination. Thus we are able to control for a
rich set of variables in our analysis. Table 1 reports summary statistics for our main sample (i.e.
individuals who feel that both national and religious identities are important) and the extended
sample (i.e. also including individuals who feel that neither, or just one, of these identities is im-
portant). Sample means across the main and extended sample are generally very similar, although
there is a greater proportion of Muslims, ethnic minorities and first generation immigrants in the
main sample, indicating a greater propensity for these individuals to value both identities.
4 Empirical analysis
In our framework, we use the term identity conflict to describe any outcome where an individual
faces penalties for failure to satisfy the norms of all groups to which they belong, and where as a
direct consequence, utility is reduced. To test this description of identity conflict, we seek to examine
whether individuals experiencing conflicting identities report lower levels of subjective wellbeing,
and estimate the following equation:
Very satisfied with lifei = β0 + β1Conflicting identitiesi + γ
′Xi + εi (6)
where Very satisfied with lifei is a dummy variable that is equal to one if an individual indicates that
they are very satisfied with life as a whole and Conflicting identitiesi is a dummy variable equal to
one if an individual indicates that their national and religious identities are very or quite important
but are in conflict at least some of the time. Xi includes the variables listed under control variables
in Table 1, which takes into account demographic characteristics, socioeconomic circumstances and
exposure to discrimination.
It is useful here to discuss the limitations of our empirical analysis with respect to how well it
matches the framework presented and how reliable the resulting estimates are. In our framework,
identity conflict may arise where the norms of both groups differ and penalty weights are non-zero,
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as in Figures 2 (a), (b) and (c), or where group norms coincide and penalty weights are non-zero
but differ across actions in different dimensions, as in Figure 3 (a). We cannot distinguish between
these alternative scenarios leading to identity conflict in our empirical analysis: β1 < 0 simply
implies that non-zero penalty weights apply across the board (and, as an aside, provides indirect
evidence supporting a key assumption in identity economics that sanctions apply for failing to
comply with group norms). It is infeasible with our data to separately identify the magnitude of
specific penalty weights: β1 simply captures the combined effect of all penalty weights. However,
the overall reduction in life satisfaction arising from the imposition of these penalty weights provides
a useful summary of the cost of identity conflict, which is of considerable interest in its own right.
For instance, minor losses in utility due to identity conflict do not present much cause for concern
whereas large utility losses may warrant policy intervention. To our knowledge we are the first to
estimate this cost. We acknowledge, however, that our analysis may be subject to omitted variable
bias and/or reverse causality. Fortunately, the Citizenship Survey contains swathes of information
not routinely collected in social surveys, including discrimination experienced in various settings,
diversity of friendship circles, immigration history, and neighbourhood characteristics, which should
reduce the scope for omitted variable bias. Some of these control variables may themselves be subject
to the same concerns though without these controls our estimate of the cost of identity conflict is
larger suggesting they perform a useful function. As regards reverse causality, while our framework
asserts the direction of causality runs from identity conflict to reduced utility, we cannot rule out
that life satisfaction determines how important people feel their national and religious identities
are, and whether there exists a conflict between these identities, in an empirical context. These
concerns should be borne in mind when interpreting our results. Nevertheless, we would argue that
our analysis represents a crucial first step towards rectifying the dearth of evidence on an important
topic.
Our results are presented in Table 2. For brevity, we present only the estimated coefficient on
‘Conflicting identities’ but a full set of results can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. Column
1, based on our main sample of individuals who think that their religion and national identities are
quite/very important, indicates that reporting conflicting identities does indeed reduce life satisfac-
tion. The probability of reporting very satisfied with life falls by 7 percentage points for individuals
indicating there is a conflict between their national and religious identities relative to other individ-
uals.15 These results suggest a non-trivial cost of identity conflict. By way of comparison, this cost
15Note that individuals who indicate their national and religious identities are rarely in conflict form part of
the reference category. If we extend our definition of conflicting identities to also include these individuals, with the
reference category now comprising individuals who never experience conflicting identities, we observe an 8 percentage
point reduction in the probability of reporting very satisfied with life. In general, there is a monotonic relationship
between frequency of experiencing conflict and the cost. For example, those who report their identities are in conflict
‘Rarely’, ‘Some of the time’, ‘Most of the time’ experience an 8, 9 and 12 percentage point decline in the probability
of reporting very satisfied with life, respectively, relative to those reporting their identities are never in conflict.
Surprisingly, the 2% of individuals who report their identities are in conflict ‘All of the time’ appear to be largely
unaffected by their predicament, perhaps because they are able to accept they cannot please all groups and carry on
regardless. Interestingly these individuals are disproportionately Muslim and regionally concentrated (i.e. 30% live
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is similar in magnitude to the cost of experiencing racial or religious discrimination in the labour
market (see Column 1 of Table A1).
Column 2 focuses exclusively on individuals who indicate that they actively practice their reli-
gion, among whom the propensity to report conflicting identities rises slightly to 19%. Moreover,
Christians are least likely to actively practice their religion while also being most likely to experience
conflicting identities if not actively practicing. The cost of identity conflict, however, remains at
a similar magnitude among those who actively practice, with an 8 percentage point decline in the
probability of feeling very satisfied with life. In column 3, we consider the cost of identity conflict
among ethnic minorities. This also changes the religious mix insofar as almost all Hindus, Sikhs and
Muslims have an ethnic minority background compared with 32% of Christians. However, since 52%
of White British actively practice their religion and 18% of ethnic minorities do not, there remain
substantial differences between the samples used in columns 2 and 3. Results in column 3 suggest
that the cost of identity conflict is similar for ethnic minorities. The stability of these results across
different samples, which vary the composition of those experiencing conflicting identities and those
that do not, increases the credibility of our findings. Moreover, these results are robust to a wide
range of control variables that might otherwise explain this association. For example, exposure to
racial/religious discrimination in the labour market or local area might increase the likelihood that
people experience conflicting identities and reduce life satisfaction. Alternatively, more recent im-
migrants may be keen to embrace all aspects of British culture increasing the possibility of conflict
between these identities while not yet having cultivated support networks to buffer against stressful
situations thus leading to lower life satisfaction. Many other factors, such as diversity of friendship
circle, language skills and area poverty, also have the potential to shape conflict between identities
and life satisfaction. Yet while discrimination, area poverty, area ethnic tensions, and general beliefs
about whether people can maintain separate cultural and religious identities are all associated with
reduced life satisfaction, there remains a cost to identity conflict. Overall, therefore, we would argue
that these results provide evidence that identity conflict is a real phenomenon.
In Column 4, we expand the sample to additionally include other religious individuals who did
not indicate that both their religion and national identities are quite/very important. This allows
us to investigate the benefit of having multiple identities relative to the drawback of identity con-
flict. We therefore construct an indicator variable ‘National and religious identities are important’,
which is equal to one if an individual indicates that both their national and religious identities are
quite/very important to them, with the reference category comprising individuals who think that
neither, or just one, of these identities is important. Our results suggest that a strong attachment
to both identities increases the likelihood of being very satisfied with life by 6 percentage points,
suggesting that the cost of identity conflict wipes out any benefits accrued from membership of
multiple groups. To investigate the benefits of group membership further, in column 5, we also
include two additional binary variables to indicate that an individual considers only their national
in West Midlands) but are otherwise remarkably similar to the rest of the sample.
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(religious) identity to be important, with the reference category now comprising individuals who
think neither of these identities is important. Relative to this reference category, individuals who
think that only their national identity matters are 2 percentage points more likely to indicate they
are very satisfied with life, which is slightly beneath the increase attributed to valuing only a reli-
gious identity, while this rises to 8 percentage points for individuals who think that both identities
are important to their sense of who they are. Thus it appears to be more beneficial to have multiple,
rather than singular, identities as long as it remains possible to satisfy the norms of all groups.
So far we have modelled the cost of identity conflict as invariant across religious groups although
in practice these groups may differ in many respects. Several academic papers have specifically
analysed the integration of Muslims (see for example Constant et al., 2006; Bisin et al., 2008;
Georgiadis and Manning, 2013) following widespread suspicion, sparked by terror attacks, that
Muslims remain apart from wider society. Constant et al. (2006); Bisin et al. (2008) show that
Muslims living in Germany and the UK are more likely to retain ethnic and religious values compared
to others though Georgiadis and Manning (2013) find little evidence to suggest Muslims exhibit
weaker levels of attachment to the UK. Given the academic interest in the fate of Muslims we pursue
a similar line of enquiry here. In the context of our analysis, national/religious groups may impose
different penalties for deviations from group norms and/or may differ in their ability to monitor
individuals’ actions. Muslims might face larger penalties for failing to conform to national group
norms because of increasingly hostility towards Muslims in Britain16 that would tend to reduce the
leeway for Muslims to deviate from national group norms relative to others. Similarly Muslims
might face larger penalties for deviating from religious group norms if, as has been argued by
Huntingdon (2002), Islam is intolerant of such behaviour. We explore whether the cost of identity
conflict varies by religious affiliation by estimating the following specification:
Very satisfied with lifei =β˜0 + β˜1Conflicting identitiesi + β˜2Conflicting identitiesi ×Muslimi
β˜3Conflicting identitiesi × Hindu/Sikhi + γ
′Xi + νi (7)
where Conflicting identitiesi ×Muslimi is equal to one if an individual is both Muslim and reports
that national and religious identities are in conflict at least some of the time (and is similarly defined
for Hindu/Sikh individuals). Recall that we already control for whether an individual is Muslim or
Hindu/Sikh via Xi. If Muslims are subject to larger penalties for failure to conform to group norms,
we would expect β2 < 0, as this would indicate that there is an additional cost of identity conflict for
Muslims relative to Christians (with β3 < 0 similarly indicating a greater cost for Hindus/Sikhs).
Results are presented in Table 3, where for ease of exposition, we present the cost of identity
conflict on life satisfaction for each faith group in the main body of the table (β˜1 for Christians, β˜1+
β˜2 for Muslims and β˜1+β˜3 for Hindus/Sikhs) and the differential cost of identity conflict for Muslims
16See http://www.cam.ac.uk/research/news/media-fuelling-rising-hostility-towards-muslims-in-britain,
https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/why-the-british-media-is-responsible-for-the-rise-in-islamophobia-in-
html
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(β˜2) and Hindus/Sikhs (β˜3) at the foot of the table. These results suggest that Christians who report
conflicting identities are 8 percentage points less likely to indicate they are very satisfied with life
relative to other Christians, with a 7 percentage point gap for Muslims reporting conflicting identities
relative to other Muslims. This provides little support for the notion that Muslims are subject to
larger penalties for failure to conform to group norms. Indeed the estimated differential cost of
identity conflict for Muslims relative to Christians is just 1 percentage point and this difference is
not statistically different from zero. Moreover since, on average, 33% of Muslims report that they
are very satisfied with life while 38% of Christians do, these percentage point reductions represent
just over a 20% change in the respective proportions of both groups reporting they are very satisfied
with life. Somewhat surprisingly, while we consistently find that Hindus/Sikhs are less likely to be
very satisfied with life compared to Christians (see Table A1 in the Appendix) there appears to be
a small, if any, cost to identity conflict for these individuals. Hindus/Skihs reporting conflicting
identities are just 3 percentage points less likely to be very satisfied with life compared to other
Hindus/Sikhs. However, the smaller sample size for this group means that neither this estimate of
identity conflict nor the differential cost of identity conflict for Hindus/Sikhs relative to Christians
is statistically different from zero, making it hard to draw firm conclusions from these results.
Our discussion in Section 2 on the impact of imperfect information on the cost of identity conflict
suggests that this cost may vary with individual characteristics. For example, some characteristics
may influence an individual’s ability to identify group norms or mitigate the impact of penal-
ties following any deviation from group norms. One such characteristic is likely to be education,
which should increase an individual’s capacity to accumulate knowledge of group norms, appreciate
nuances in these norms and adopt a more flexible approach to satisfying own and group norms.
Moreover, education facilitates geographical mobility, which would tend to reduce the capacity of
groups to monitor behaviour. We therefore consider how the cost of identity conflict varies for
those with and without formal education.17 The results presented in Table 4 clearly indicate that
the cost of identity conflict is larger for less educated individuals (i.e. those without any formal
qualifications). For example, high-educated individuals reporting a conflict between national and
religious identities are 6 percentage points less likely to feel very satisfied with life relative to other
high-educated individuals, while this difference is almost twice as large, at 11 percentage points,
between low-educated individuals. This differential cost of identity conflict by education level is
statistically significant. Since individuals lacking formal education are also likely to be older, we
have also considered to what extent this differential cost might be explained by age but find a
similar cost of identity conflict for younger and older individuals.
17We have also considered finer education categories, such as holding a degree, A-levels or GCSE’s, but the main
difference appears between those who have or do not have formal qualifications. Interestingly, there is little evidence
to support differences in the cost of identity conflict between those holding a diploma in higher education and those
with foreign education relative to those without formal qualifications. As a diploma in higher education has minimal
entry requirements and is usually obtained while in employment this result suggests that formal qualifications matter
if they are obtained via the British schooling system.
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In summary, we find evidence that individuals who believe their national and religious identities
are in conflict report lower levels of life satisfaction compared to others, which suggests that identity
conflict is a real phenomenon. Moreover, the cost of identity conflict is non-trivial, reducing life
satisfaction by the same amount as experiencing discrimination in the labour market. In spite of
the behaviour of Muslims attracting the attention of researchers in the immigration and integration
literature, we find that religious affiliation makes little difference to the cost of identity conflict,
with Christians and Muslims affected in the same way. On the other hand, we find that that
cost of identity conflict is lower among individuals with formal education, which is likely to equip
people with the necessary skills to interpret the location of group norms and penalties for deviating
from these norms. This suggests that, in the context of national and religious identities, it is the
behaviour of individuals rather than of groups that determines the cost of identity conflict.
5 Conclusion
We build on the work of Akerlof and Kranton (2000), Wichardt (2008) and Georgiadis and Manning
(2013) to examine the tensions that may arise as individuals try to maintain multiple identities.
Specifically, our theoretical framework allows for multiple identities as well as norms defined in terms
of actions in multiple dimensions. Using the term identity conflict to refer to any outcome where an
individual experiences penalties for failure to satisfy the norms of all groups, we show that identity
conflict emerges under various situations where group norms differ. However, a novel implication
of our framework, which offers important new insights on the subject of identity economics, is that
identity conflict may arise even when the actions required to fully satisfy the norms of distinct
groups coincide, and may not materialise even when these required actions defining group norms
differ.
We test the basic features of our framework exploiting a unique question in the Citizenship Sur-
vey that focuses on the potential for conflict between national and religious identities. Specifically,
our framework suggests that individuals experiencing conflicting identities, ceteris paribus, ought
to exhibit lower levels of utility. We show this to be the case using data on life satisfaction as a
proxy for utility. Our results suggest that the cost of identity conflict is of similar magnitude to the
cost of experiencing discrimination in the labour market. This finding also has broader implications
for the identity economics literature insofar as it provides indirect evidence of a core assumption
i.e. that people face penalties for deviating from the norm of a group. Although we cannot rule
out the possibility that other explanations are responsible for our empirical findings, we are able to
show that the cost of identity conflict remains stable across different samples and is robust to con-
trolling for a number of important confounding variables that are not routinely available in survey
data. While the cost of identity conflict does not vary by religious affiliation, we find evidence that
formal education, or lack thereof, is important in shaping this cost. Policies to alleviate identity
conflict might therefore focus on increasing levels of formal education. To our knowledge, this is
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the first formalisation of identity conflict and the first use of subjective wellbeing data to provide
supporting evidence of its existence in the identity economics literature, which suggests there are
many potential avenues for future research. A natural starting point might be to consider the cost
of identity conflict in other contexts and/or to better address causality.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics
Main sample Additional sample
mean sd mean sd
Dependent variable:
Very satisfied with life 0.35 0.48 0.34 0.47
Key variable of interest:
Conflicting identities 0.18 0.39 0.11 0.32
Variables relevant to the extended sample:
National and religious identities are important 1.00 0.00 0.62 0.49
Religion only important 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.21
National identity only important 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.43
Control variables:
Muslim 0.38 0.48 0.27 0.44
Hindu/Sikh 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.27
Actively practices religion 0.71 0.45 0.52 0.50
Ethnic minority 0.64 0.48 0.49 0.50
Female 0.57 0.50 0.54 0.50
Aged 30-39 0.24 0.43 0.23 0.42
Aged 40-49 0.21 0.41 0.22 0.41
Aged 50-69 0.33 0.47 0.34 0.48
Partner 0.56 0.50 0.55 0.50
Two adults 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.50
Three or more adults 0.27 0.44 0.24 0.43
Kids 0.38 0.49 0.35 0.48
Very good health 0.39 0.49 0.40 0.49
Good health 0.40 0.49 0.39 0.49
High education 0.73 0.44 0.76 0.43
Employed 0.55 0.50 0.58 0.49
ln(hours+1) 1.89 1.76 2.04 1.76
Unemployed 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.21
ln(income+1) 9.44 2.18 9.56 2.08
Unknown income 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.34
Financial hardship past year 0.55 0.50 0.57 0.49
Homeowner 0.60 0.49 0.62 0.49
Racial/religious discrimination in labour market 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.21
Religious discrimination in public services 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.20
Racial/religious harassment in local area 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.25
Fears racial/religious attack in local area 0.20 0.40 0.16 0.36
No respect for ethnic differences in local area 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.29
Believes people cannot maintain separate cultural/religious identities 0.19 0.39 0.23 0.42
All friends of same race 0.29 0.46 0.34 0.47
All friends of same faith 0.25 0.43 0.26 0.44
Born abroad 0.38 0.49 0.29 0.45
Arrived in UK within past 5 years 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.13
Interview translation help required 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.19
North East 0.03 0.16 0.04 0.19
North West 0.11 0.32 0.13 0.33
Yorkshire & Humber 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.30
East Midlands 0.06 0.25 0.07 0.25
West Midlands 0.13 0.34 0.12 0.33
East of England 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.25
South East 0.08 0.27 0.10 0.30
South West 0.04 0.20 0.06 0.23
Wales 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.19
Deprived area 0.43 0.50 0.36 0.48
Interviewed in Winter 0.26 0.44 0.25 0.43
Interviewed in 2010/11 wave 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.50
Interviewed as core sample member 0.43 0.49 0.57 0.50
N 11332 18265
The main sample comprises individuals who think that both their national and religious identities are quite/very important. The
extended sample includes all individuals regardless of their attachment to national and religious identities. Individuals who indicate
they have no religion or national identity are excluded from the analysis altogether.
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Table 2: Impact of conflicting identities on reporting very satisfied with life
Main
sample
(1)
Actively
practices
(2)
Ethnic
minorities
(3)
Additional
sample
(4)
Additional
sample
(5)
Conflicting identities -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
National and religious identities are important 0.06*** 0.08***
(0.01) (0.01)
National identity only important 0.02*
(0.01)
Religion only important 0.03*
(0.02)
N 11332 8084 7282 18265 18265
Notes: See Section 4 for details of the estimation strategy. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. Significance levels are
shown as *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. See Table A1 for full set of results that include marginal effects for control variables.
Table 3: Impact of conflicting identities on reporting very satisfied with life, by
religion
(1)
Christian -0.08***
(0.02)
Muslim -0.07***
(0.02)
Hindu/Sikh -0.03
(0.03)
Muslim - Christian 0.01
(0.02)
Hindu/Sikh - Christian 0.05
(0.04)
N 11332
Notes: See notes to Table 2
Table 4: Impact of conflicting identities on reporting very satisfied with life, by
education
(1)
Low education -0.11***
(0.02)
High education -0.06***
(0.01)
High - low education 0.06**
(0.02)
N 11332
Notes: See notes to Table 2
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Table A1: Table 2 presenting full set of control variables
Main
sample
(1)
Actively
practices
(2)
Ethnic
minorities
(3)
Additional
sample
(4)
Additional
sample
(5)
Conflicting identities -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Muslim -0.02* -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Hindu/Sikh -0.04** -0.06*** -0.03* -0.03** -0.03**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Actively practices religion 0.02* 0.00 0.03*** 0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ethnic minority -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Female 0.02 0.02 0.02** 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Aged 30-39 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Aged 40-49 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Aged 50-69 0.05*** 0.05** 0.05** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Partner 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.08***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Two adults 0.04*** 0.03* 0.02 0.05*** 0.05***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Three or more adults 0.04*** 0.03* 0.03** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Kids 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Very good health 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.24*** 0.24***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Good health 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
High education -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Employed 0.15*** 0.08 0.12** 0.10*** 0.10***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03)
ln(hours+1) -0.05*** -0.03** -0.04** -0.04*** -0.04***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Unemployed -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.08***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
ln(income+1) 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Unknown income 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Financial hardship past year -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.08***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Homeowner 0.03*** 0.03** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Racial/religious discrimination in labour market -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Religious discrimination in public services -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Racial/religious harassment in local area -0.04*** -0.04** -0.05*** -0.03** -0.03**
Continued on next page
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(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Fears racial/religious attack in local area -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
No respect for ethnic differences in local area -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.04** -0.05*** -0.05***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Believes people cannot maintain separate cultural/religious identities -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
All friends of same race 0.03** 0.04** 0.04* 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
All friends of same faith 0.04*** 0.04** 0.06*** 0.02** 0.02**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Born abroad 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Arrived in UK within past 5 years 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Interview translation help required 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
North East 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.04** 0.04**
(0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02)
North West 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Yorkshire & Humber 0.03 0.01 0.03* 0.03** 0.03**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
East Midlands 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
West Midlands -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02* -0.02*
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
East of England -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
South East 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
South West -0.01 -0.00 -0.07 0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02)
Wales 0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02)
Deprived area -0.02* -0.01 -0.02 -0.02** -0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Interviewed in Winter -0.02* -0.02* -0.02** -0.02** -0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Interviewed in 2010/11 wave -0.01* -0.01 -0.02** -0.02** -0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Interviewed as core sample member 0.04** 0.03* 0.04** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
National and religious identities are important 0.06*** 0.08***
(0.01) (0.01)
National identity only important 0.02*
(0.01)
Religion only important 0.03*
(0.02)
N 11332 8084 7282 18265 18265
Notes: See notes to Table 2.
28
